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SOLDIERS' AND SAILORS' CIVIL
RELIEF ACT IN 1942: OPERATION,
NEED FOR CLARIFICATION,
FUTURE SIGNIFICANCE
BROOKE TIBBS*
T HE Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act as it now stands is a
composite of similar legislation passed in 1918 during the last
war, substantially re-enacted in 1940 more than a year before the
United States entered the present war, and of amendments adopted in
1942.1
The express purpose of the Act is to "suspend enforcement,"
temporarily, of civil liabilities of persons in the military service in order
to entitle them to devote their entire energy to the "defense needs" of
* Yale University, A.B.; Univ. of Wisconsin, LL.B.; Chairman, Legal Service
Committee, Milwaukee Bar Association; Member Board of Governors, Wis-
consin Bar Association.
54 Stat. 1178; 56 Stat. 282; Public Laws No. 732, also 753, 77th Cong.; see also
50 U.S.C. § 501-585. References are to section numbers as used in Statutes and
Amending Acts of 1942.
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the nation.2 With few exceptions, the provisions of the Act do not re-
lieve a debtor of liability.3 Although certain rights have been recognized
as being "extinguished," the Act is officially described as "freezing"
debt obligations, as "directed toward merely the withholding of reme-
dies," and as affecting only adjective law.4 In general it provides a
qualified moratorium on civil liabilities of men in the armed forces and
certain others incidentally affected.
The method by which the soldier 5 is protected and the rights of the
various parties are adjusted, is through judicial machinery, broad dis-
cretionary power being lodged in the courts.
Despite division of the Act under headings, provisions under vari-
ous of such headings must be considered in order to really determine
how the law applies to any particular subject.
SPECIFIC APPLICATION OF THE ACT.
The principal subject of relief is the soldier's civil liability which
existed at the time of entry into military service. However, all actions
against the soldier are subject to supervision; and relief is expressly
afforded as to certain liabilities incurred subsequent to entrance into
military service, as in relation to leases, taxes, and insurance.6
The person entitled to benefits of the Act is primarily a person in the
military service of the United States, such service period being gen-
erally considered to commence with the order to report for induction.7
Citizens serving in the armed forces of other United Nations are also
protected." Dependents of the soldier are afforded relief in relation to
lease, purchase contracts, and secured liabilities; also as to taxes other
than income.9 The lessor of the soldier is granted conditional relief as
to the leased property; and employes of a soldier apparently have cer-
tain protection in respect to real estate taxes.'0 Persons secondarily
liable with the soldier, and his sureties, may be afforded relief correla-
tive to that granted the soldier." The Act also seems to have limited
application to a "homestead entryman" engaged in performing farm
labor, without any military service whatever.. 2
2 Title of Act and Section 100.
3 Cf. 1917 Wis. Statutes § 4232a, rendering a soldier "exempt from civil process ;"
held to contravene the 1918 Soldiers' Relief Act: Konkel v. State, 168 Wis. 335.
4 Hearings before Committee on Military Affairs on H.R. 7029, 77th Cong.
10, 11, 47.
5 "Soldier" is used herein to refer to a "person in military service" under the
Act.
6 Secs. 300, 500(1), 513, 700(1), 400(a).
7 Sec. 101 (1) (2) ; 106. "Missing" persons are deemed in military service: sec.
601(3).
8 Secs. 104, 512.
9 Secs. 306; 500(1).
10 Secs. 300(2) (4), 500(1).
11 Sec. 103; see also sec. 204 as to proceeding against co-defendants.
12 Sec. 510(1).
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As to procedure, relief can be granted by "any court" of the United
States or its territories in "any action or proceeding." 13 The action may
be one against the soldier, or may have been brought by the soldier.14
Where no action is pending, the soldier or his dependent may, under
certain circumstances, make special application to the court for relief,
as in relation to extension by instalment payments and relief from
eviction or rental liability under a lease.' 5 Similar application may be
made by the creditor of the soldier for correlative relief respecting
purchase contracts, mortgages, and taxes where relief is granted to
the soldier under a lease, and to prevent reduction of interest rate to
the 6% otherwise limited by the Act.'6 The court may disregard the
Act if property dispositions have been made "with intent to delay the
just enforcement" of certain rights.17
In most cases the court's power is exercised by ordering a stay of
proceedings. A general power of stay is provided for "any action or
proceeding"; and for relief from penalty.' A special power of stay is
provided in relation to persons secondarily liable, executions and attach-
ments, rights of both tenant and owner under leases, in relation to sales
contracts, secured obligations, storage liens, and tax sales.' 9 Co-ordinate
to the general stay is a general tolling of limitations both for and against
the soldier during the period of military service except as to Revenue
Laws 20
The power of the court is largely discretionary. In some situations
the court's power depends on whether the soldier's military service has-
had an adverse effect upon his ability to pay,2' or on ability to interpose
his defense.22 In still other situations the court's discretion is described
in varying but broad terms. 23 And in some situations this discretion is
entirely unqualified, as in requiring plaintiff to file bond before entry of
judgment, and in granting stays to persons secondarily liable.2 4
An essential part of procedure under the Act is the appointment of
an attorney for the soldier. The court is required to appoint an attorney
for a defendant before entry of judgment against him, and after period
of default, unless it affirmatively appears that such defendant is not
in military service. Showing in this regard may be made by affidavit
"s Secs. 102(1) (2), 200(1), 201.
'4 Compare secs. 200, 201.
'5 Secs. 700,300.
16 Secs. 304(2), 206.
'7 Sec. 600.
18 Secs. 201, 204,202.
' 
9 Secs. 103(1), 203(2) (b), 300(2), 301(3), 302(2) (a), 305(2) (a), and 500(2),
respectively.
20 Sees. 205, 207.
21 Secs. 202, 200, 300(2), 301(3), 302(2), 305, 306, 500(2).
22 Sec. 200 (4), 201.2 3 See Footnote 89.
24 Secs. 200(1) ; and 103(1) (2).
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or by official certificate.2 5 The court also has discretionary power to
appoint an attorney for a soldier where he, is not otherwise repre-
sented.-" The soldier's "legal representative" (as well as the soldier) is
expressly authorized to apply for relief from a judgment; and the attor-
ney would apparently be a "person on behalf" of the soldier who would
be authorized to apply for a stay in the course of any court proceeding.
27
However, the attorney has no power to waiver.2 8 And it is apparently
contemplated that the lawyer serve without compensation, except pos-
sibly in probate proceedings.29
Waiver of rights under the Act is covered, and apparently limited,
by three provisions. The soldier may waive right in relation to secured
obligations and sales contracts by written agreement of the parties,
presumably bi-lateral, executed after the soldier has entered military
service.2 0 A co-obligor of the soldier, generally a guarantor or an
accommodation maker, may waive by a writing, separate from the main
obligation, apparently unilateral,--which is rendered ineffective if such
co-obligor subsequently enters military service. 31 And life insurance col-
lateral may be released by written consent of the soldier.3 2 As above
stated, power of waiver is expressly denied to the attorney representing
the soldier.
33
Actions generally against the soldier are the subject of general relief
under the law. An attorney may be appointed for the soldier at any
stage of such proceedings; and such appointment is mandatory before
entry of any judgment against the soldier.3 4 On application made during
or within sixty days after military service, relief may be obtained by
requiring plaintiff to file bond, by stay of proceedings on just terms for
a period up to three months after military service, and by order "to
protect the rights of the soldier. 3 5
25 Sec. 200(1); 601. As to an action involving more than one 'judgment," see
20 Neb. Law Rev. 357, 361. Affidavit of non-military service made before ex-
piration of time for answer held insufficient: National Bank v. Van Tassel,
36 N.Y.S. (2d) 478 (1942) ; and see cases under 1918 Act cited 28 Iowa Law
Rev. 19. Court finding on "adequate investigation" held to constitute sufficient
proof of non-military service: Petition of Institution for Savings (Mass. 1941)
33 N.E. (2d) 526.
2r Sec. 200(3).
27 Secs. 200(4), and 201.
28 Sec. 200(3).
29 Weyenberg v. Downey, 25 N.Y.S. (2d) 600 (1941) ; In re Cool's Estate (N.J.
1941) 18 Atl. (2d) 714; see also Memorandum of Committee on National
Defense, A.B.A. 3/25/41, p. 5.
30 Sec. 107.
31 Sec. 103 (4).
32 Sec. 305(1).
33 Sec. 200(3).
34 Sec. 200(3), 200(1).
35 Secs. 200(l) (3), 201, 204.
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Judgments against the soldier are subject to general stay of en-
forcement,3 8 and cognovit judgments cannot be enforced by sale or
seizure of security, without court approval, during or within three
months after military service.37 Judgments entered against soldiers dur-
ing or within thirty days after military service are subject to vacation
on application within ninety days after military service.38
Garnishment and attachment proceedings are governed by the above
provisions relating to actions generally and to judgments; and are also
subject to express restriction by stay and vacation. 39
As to the soldier's obligations generally, existing prior to military
service, maturity may be extended on an instalment basis and on other
just terms, provided application is made during or within six months
after military service.4 0 Interest on all such obligations is limited to
6% unless on application by the obligee, a court finds that the soldier's
ability to pay is not materially affected by the military service.41
Obligations secured by real estate owned by a soldier are subject
to the above provisions relating to actions, judgments, and obligations
generally. Such debts which existed prior to military service are also
covered by express provisions: (a) that there be court approval of any
sale or foreclosure of such security during and within three months
after military service; (b) that foreclosure commenced during military
service be subject to stay or other equitable disposition; and (c) that
maturity may be extended on an instalment basis for a period equal to
the combination of the period of military service and the remaining
life of the obligation.42 The Act also contains a provision that no part
of the period of military service after October 6, 1942 shall be included
in any period "provided by any law for the rememption of real property
sold * * to enforce any obligation * *."43 As above indicated, the Act
does permit of waiver of such relief by written agreement of the parties
executed after the commencement of the period of military service.44
Obligations secured by personal property are covered by the above
provisions relating to "obligations secured by real estate"--excepting
(a) maturity may be extended only for a period equal to that of the
prior military service,-not to the combined period of military service
and remaining life of the contract ;45 and (b) period of redemption is
36 Secs. 201,203(2), 204.
3 Sec. 302(3).
38 Sec. 200 (4).
39 Secs. 204,203 (b).40 Sec. 700.
41 Sec. 206.
42 Secs. 302(3) ; 302(2) ; and 700(1) (2), respectively.
43 Sec. 205.
44Sec. 107.
45 Sec. 700(1) (b).
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not extended. However, other provisions relate specially to personal
property. Repossession of real property may be made by leave of court
after an appraisal and payment of "just" sum to the soldier or depend-
ent, where undue hardship will not result to such persons.4 Life insur-
ance collateral cannot be taken over by the creditor during or within
a year after the military service except by leave of court; and the
government-guaranteed policies cannot be "forfeited" for "any in-
debtedness.'47 A lien for storage cannot be enforced without court
approval during or within three months after military service.48
Sales of real and personal property are subject to the appropriate
provisions above referred to. Furthermore, where such contracts were
effective by payment prior to military service, they are enforceable only
by court action, the court having power to order repayment, reposses-
sion, stay of proceedings, or other equitable disposition. 49 With respect
to real estate sales, maturity may be extended on just terms and with
equal periodic instalments for a period equal to that of military service
combined with the remaining life of the contract.50 With respect to per-
sonal property sales, (a) maturity may be similarly extended for the
military service period ;5 and (b) repossession may be effected by
leave of court after an appraisal and payment of a just sum to the sol-
dier or dependent where "undue hardship" will not result.52 The Act
permits waiver of such relief by written agreement of the parties exe-
cuted after the commencement of military service.53
Liability under leases, as for accrued rent, is subject to the appro-
priate general provisions above referred to, also to certain special
provisions.
-As to a lease executed before the tenant's entry into military
service and covering property occupied by the soldier's dependents,
rent liability may be terminated in general on thirty days' written
notice, effective on monthly rent day, otherwise on the last day of a
calendar month ;-although this relief is subject to modification as "jus-
tice and equity may under the- circumstances require," upon application
by the lessor within the termination period.54 A lease with a view to
purchase is also subject to the provisions relating to sales of property.55
-As to a lease on the home of dependents of the soldier, unless the
monthly rental exceeds $80, eviction rights must be exercised by court
48 Sec. 303.
47 Secs. 305(1) ;403.
48 Sec. 305 (2).
49 Secs.301(1); 301(3).
50 Sec. 700(1) (a).
52 Sec. 700(1) (b).
52 Sec. 303.
5s Sec. 107.
54 Sec. 304(1) (2).
5 Sec. 301 (1).
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action, and the court may "stay the proceedings for not longer than
three months" or "make such other order as may be just" ;-although
where such relief is granted to the tenant, the lessor is "entitled" to
relief "similar" to that provided by the Act in respect to sales of
property, secured obligations, and taxes.5 6 (For "tax" provisions see
below). Payments on such rental may be ordered out of the soldier's
allotment under government regulations. 7 Certain provisions, relating
to leases may be waived by written agreement executed after the soldier
has entered military service.58
As to all taxes except on income, including taxes on real property
occupied by dependents "or employes" of a soldier, sale cannot be had
except by leave of court; such sale will be stayed until six months after
military service if the soldier's ability to pay is materially affected by
his military service.5 9 Moreover, if real estate tax sale is had, the period
of military service is not to be included in computing the period of
redemption.60 On application made during or within six months after
military service, maturity of all taxes may be extended on an instalment
basis for the period of military service and on other just terms.6 1
Income taxes of the soldier may be deferred as to collection during
and for six months after military service if the soldier's ability to pay
is materially impaired; and he is protected against double residence for
state tax purposes.6
2
Life insurance of a soldier is, on application, subject to protection.
Policies up to $10,000, in force October 6, 1942 or at least thirty days
before entrance into military service, -may be covered by government
guaranty of premium during and for two years after military service;
such policies cannot be forfeited for indebtedness. 6 3 As above stated,
a debt secured by any of a soldier's life insurance as collateral is sub-
ject to restriction in enforcement. 64
Rights of the soldier in public lands are the subject of protection
under the Act, to-wit: Homestead rights, desert lands, irrigation
rights, rights to mineral lands, and mining claims.6 5 To obtain certain
of such relief, the oldier is required to file notice within a limited time
after entrance into military service, or after October 6, 1942.66 The
period of relief variously extends for the period of military service and
s Secs. 300(1) ; and 300(2).
57 Sec. 300(4).
58 Sec. 107(b).
59 Sec. 500(1) (2).
60 Sec. 205.6 1 Sec. 700(1) (b).
62 Secs. 513; 514.
63 Sec. 400-408.
64 See. 305(1).
65 Secs. 502, 503(1) (2) ; 504(1) (2) ; 508; 501(1), 506(1); 505(1).
66 Secs. 504(3), 505 (2), 506(2), 510(1).
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six months thereafter, also for a period of hospitalization and dis-
ability.8 7
Probate proceedings are not expressly referred to in the Act. How-
ever, the provisions as to general relief, relating to the filing of affidavit
as to non-military service, the appointment of attorney for defendant,
the vacation of judgment, and the granting of stays relate to "any
action or proceeding commenced in any court"; and the Act provides
for tolling of limitations-on the "bringing of any action or proceedings
in any court," in actions by or against "heirs, executors, administrators"
of the soldier.6 8 And a New Jersey court has expressly held probate pro-
ceedings to be within the purview of the relief statute. 9 It may be noted,
however, that the benefits of the Act have been held not extend to a
soldier acting in a representative capacity.70
Penalties for violations of the Act are provided in certain respects.
Breach or attempted breach, knowingly, of the provisions relating to
repossession on sales, secured obligations, exiction, life insurance col-
lateral, and storage liens, constitute misdemeanors.7 1 Similarly inten-
tional use of a false affidavit of non-military service, and improper
attempt to collect rent accruing after lease termination, are declared to
be misdemeanors.7 2
QUESTIONS OF INTENT AND CONSTRUCTION
In some respects the intent of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Relief Act
is doubtful and judicial construction may well involve various legal
questions, for example:
-Was it intended that the period for relief against a judgment
expire ninety days after the termination of military service, even though
the soldier have notice or knowledge of the entry of such judg-
ment ?1
-Is it entirely consistent and practical that varying periods of
time be fixed in limiting the soldier's right to apply for relief under
the Act? Six months after end of military service is provided in respect
to extension on maturities on an instalment basis,74 and redemption
from tax sales. 5 Ninety days after end of military service is apparently
provided in relation to vacation of a judgment76 Sixty days after end
67 See secs. 501(1), 502, 503(2), 504(1) (2), 505(1), 508.
68 Secs. 200, 201; 205.
8 In re Cool's Estate, (N.J. 1941) 18 AtI. (2d) 714; and see 28 Iowa Law Rev.
29-32.70 Halle v. Canenaugh (N.H. 1920) 111 Atl. 76.
71 Secs. 301 (2), 302 (4), 300 (3), 305 (3).
72 Secs. 200(2) ; 304(3).
73 Cf. sec. 200(4).
74 Sec. 700.
75 Sec. 500(3).
76 Sec. 200 (4).
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of military service is apparently provided in relation to stays of pro-
ceedings generally.77 Six months after start of military service is pro-
vided in relation to public lands.78
after start of military service is provided in relation to public lands.8
-Is it entirely consistent that the relief to the soldier extend for
varying periods of time after his military service? A period equal to
that of military service is provided in relation to extension of maturity
on instalment basis.7 9 Two years after military service is provided in
relation to protection of life insurance policies, and one year for life
insurance collateral.8 0 Six months after termination of military service
is provided for stays in relation to tax sales and income taxes.8 ' Three
months after military service is the protection period on foreclosure of
encumbrances and sales generally, on storage lien enforcement, and on
stays generally. 2
Is it entirely consistent that the period of the soldier's hospitalization
and disability be added to his direct military service in computing the
time within which the soldier may apply for relief in certain respects, 3
and not in others?
-Was it intended that the special relief relating to foreclosure
actions on secured obligations not apply to actions brought immediately
after military service ?s'
Is it consistent that the benefits of the Act extend to the soldier's
dependents only in matters involved under Article III (generally leases,
sales, mortgages) and in respect to taxes, and not in respect to other
general provisions ?85
-Who are "dependents" of the soldier ?"'
-What is the significance of the varying provisions as to the court's
extent and manner of considering facts and relief? In one instance the
requirement is "notice and hearing," in another, "such notice to the par-
ties affected as it may require," in another "hearing" ;87 in other pro-
visions notice and hearing are not mentioned. The term "opinion of
7 Sec. 201.
78 Secs. 504(1), 505(1) (2), 506(2), 511.
79 Sec. 700.
80 Secs. 403; 305 (1).
81 Secs. 500(2) (3) ; 513.
82 Secs. 302 (3) ; 305 (2), 204. Comment 91 Penn. Law Rev. 192 re six month-three
month variance.
83 Secs. 504(1), 505 (1), 508.
84 See sec. 302(3) relating to proceedings "commenced during the period of mili-
tary service."
85 Sec. 306; cf, sec. 300, 500, 103(4), 503. Comment 36 Ill. Law Rev. of North-
western Univ. 337.
86 Act contains no definition, although one provision, sec. 300(1), refers to the
"wife, children, or other dependents." Comment in Hearings before Committee
on Military Affairs on H.R..7029, 77th Cong. pp. 23, 24.
87 Secs. 700; 602; 302(2).
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the court" likewise is used with relation to some,8 8 but not all fact
determinations ?
-What various meanings, if any, are intended in describing the
types of court orders authorized to be made under the Act: "As may
be equitable to conserve the interest(s) of all parties"; "as justice and
equity may in the circumstances require"; "in accordance with princi-
ples of equity and justice"; "as in its (the court's) opinion may be
necessary to protect rights"; "as may be just?"8 9
-Is any distinction intended between the "leave" of court required
in relation to disposition of life insurance collateral ;90 and the "ap-
proval" by the court, required in relation to enforcement of storage
liens, and other relief ?91
-In matters relating to sales contracts, is the court required to enter
a stay of proceedings if the defendant's ability is materially affected
by his military service; or, may the court make any disposition of the
case as may be "equitable" .1u
. -What distinction is intended between the two terms used to
describe the effect military service must have had upon the soldier's
financial situation to entitle him to relief under the Act, to-wit: mate-
rially "impaired" and materially "affected ?"3
-What is the nature of the relief, "similar" to that granted persons
in military service, which, in event of lease termination, may be granted
to a lessor not in military service.94
-Is a distinction intended between the term "equal instalments"
and the "equal periodic instalments" in the two provisions relating to
extension of obligations?"
-Is the court's power to stay exiction proceedings limited to three
months .
-Has the court any power, discretionary or otherwise, to have rent
paid by use of allotment, which may be ordered under "regulations"
88 Sees. 304(2), 305 (1), 306, 500(2).
89Secs. 301(3), 302(2)(b), 305(2)(b); 304(2); 103(3); 200(1); 204, 300(2),
700. Note absence of any qualification in discretion relating to posting of bond
and relief to sureties [(secs. 200(1) and 103(1) (2)] ; comment on wide discre-
tionary power in 36 I1. (N.W.) Law Review, 325; comment regarding section
304(2) in 91 Penn Law Rev. 186.
90 Sec. 305(1).91 Secs. 305(2), 302(3).
92 Compare "shall," with use of "or" connecting the various clauses in sec. 301 (3).
93Secs. 202, 306; and 201, 206, 300(2), 301(3), 302(2), 305(1), 700(1), respec-
tively.
DA Sec. 300 (2).
95 Subsec. (a) and (b) of sec. 700(1).
.6 See sec. 300(2) ; compare Gilluly v. Hawkins (Wash. 1919) 182 Pac. 958; and
Riordan v. Zube (Cal. App. 1920) 195 Pac. 65; note discussion, Hearings be-
fore Committee on Military Affairs on H.R. 7029, 77th Cong. pp. 14-17; also 91
Penn Law Rev. 84.
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prescribed by the Secretaries of War and Navy?9& Was it intended that
an owner of real estate, unlike other creditors, be compelled to extend
credit for three months or other period to the soldier-tenant without
any financial protection within control of the court.98
-Is it entirely consistent that, when a soldier-lessee obtains relief,
correlative relief may be granted his lessor, yet when a soldier-mort-
gagor obtains relief, correlative relief is not so afforded his mort-
gagee?99
-Is the redemption period in a real estate mortgage foreclosure,
which, as in Wisconsin, occurs primarily before a sale, necessarily
extended by the period of military service of any defendant?100
-Is it intended that there be no extension of redemption period in
relation to tax or mortgage sales of personal property ?1'
-Should not the soldier or dependent or employe be required to
file notice by affidavit or otherwise, in order to obtain relief relating to
tax sales ?1o2
-Is the "appointment" of attorney mandatory before entry of
judgment against a soldier even though he personally appears or is rep-
resented by an authorized attorney ?1o3
-Is there any significance in the distinction between the "legal
representative" who may act on behalf of a soldier in respect to vaca-
tion of judgments, and the "person on * * behalf of the soldier" who
may apply for a stay of proceedings ?104
-Who is a "bona fide purchaser for value under such judgment,"
in the provision protecting third party rights on vacation of a judgment
entered against the soldier ?los
-Was it intended that a soldier be permitted to waive secondary
liability rights by execution of a writing during military service? If
so, can all rights under the Act be so waived?106
97 Compare sec. 300(4). Information as to "prescribed regulations," if any, is not
available in this corps area.
98 Compare sec. 300(2) and (4) ; see Comment 91 Penn L. Rev. 184.
99Lessor relief under secs. 300, 304. Protection need of mortgagee would in-
clude taxes on real estate not occupied by soldier, dependent or employe. Cf.
sec. 500(1). See also Comment 91 Penn Law Rev. 187.
100 Compare sec. 205 relating to redemption of property "sold." Comment 28 Law
Rev. 14.
10 Compare extension of redemption on sales of real estate under sec. 205.
102 Under sec. 500(1) (2) no method is provided by which municipal authorities
can practically determine who property in the municipality is and is not owned
or occupied by a person "in military service" or his dependent or employe.
Compare filing of notices in relatioin to public lands, secs. 504(3), 505(2),
506(2).103 Note use of phrase "shall have appointed" in sec. 200(1).
*204 Secs. 200(4), and 201.
105 Sec. 200(4). For varying opinions as to whether a purchaser can be "bona
fide" where requirements as filing of affidavit of non-military service, have
not been complied with, see 28 Iowa Law Rev. 23-27, 34.106 Cf. sec. 103(4) under which such waiver is rendered invalid by "subsequent'
entrance into military service. See Report, War Work Sub-Committee, A.B.A.
7/18/42, p. 5; also 15 Wis. Bar Association Bulletin, p, 222.
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-Does the Act apply to administrative agencies and governmental
tribunals? While the provision as to tolling of limitations, as recently
amended, includes "any action or proceeding in any court, board,
bureau, commission, department, or other agency of government," the
general authority under the Act applies only to "courts.
10 7
What if any power has the court to appoint a custodian for property
of the soldier during his military service ?107a
FUTURE IMPORTANCE OF CLARIFICATION
The immediate purpose of the Act is to strengthen the morale of the
soldier during the war, but the substantial significance and value of this
legislation depend upon its application after the war. This law is de-
signed as both present and future protection for individual property
rights of the men in the armed forces. If those property rights are
denied, or prejudiced, as a result of military service, not only will the
men properly feel that a grave injustice has been done them, but their
part in our economic system, and indeed that system itself, may be
jeopardized. In view of the number of men in the armed forces, and
the period of time involved, this Relief Act will be of far greater sig-
nificance in our nationay life than any other similar law in the history
of the country.
To make the Act really effective after the war, (a) the rights of
the soldier must be made known to him immediately upon his discharge
from military service; (b) he must be properly represented in the en-
forcement of his rights; and (c) such rights must be as free from
doubt as possible, so that they may be judicially declared without undue
delay.
Doubt as to the meaning of provisions of this Act will result in
extended legal controversy which, regardless of outcome, may well
deprive soldiers of the relief intended. Neither the soldier's financial
situation, nor the amount involved, will normally permit of long drawn-
out litigation. To avoid this danger, at least the apparent difficulties
of construction should be eliminated if possible. In respect to this par-
ticular statute, the need for later judicial clarification should be re-
duced to a minimum. It is submitted that Congress might consider
the possibility of clarifying phraseology of the Soldier's and Sailor's
Civil Relief Act in respects above mentioned.
107 Secs. 205; 101(4). See Hearings before Committee on Military Affairs on
H.R. 7029, 77th Cong. 13; also recommendation War Work Sub-Committee,
A.B.A. 7/18/42, p. 23.
1o7aCompare Alberta Statutes 4 Geo VI c 4 (1940) providing for "Public
Administrator" to care for soldier's property; and approval comment 36 Ill.
L. Rev. of Northwestern Univ. 334.
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LAWYERS AND THE FUTURE OF THE RELIEF ACT
The lawyer is already a vital factor in the present operation of the
Civil Relief Act. The American Bar Association and local associations
had set up facilities to render legal service under the Act some time
before the United States entered the war. Since December 1941,
thousands of lawyers throughout the nation have offered their services
and, without compensation, have handled tens of thousands of legal
matters for men in the armed forces and their dependents. Requests for
such service have come from the American Red Cross, Army Emer-
gency Relief, the U.S.O. and other public and private relief organiza-
tions as well as directly from the soldier."01
After the war, when the soldiers are leaving military service, it
will be vital that the ex-service men promptly obtain correct informa-
tion as to their rights under the Act; and that they be properly rep-
resented in the enforcement of those right. Lawyers will be essential in
both respects. Although the Act provides for official notice to the soldier
"of the benefits accorded by" it,109 it is obvious that he cannot fully
understand the scope and limitations of the relief afforded under this
complex statute without professional legal advice. Moreover the need
for such promptness and accuracy in obtaining such service is accen-
tuated by the relatively shor 10 and varying periods after military
service within which the soldier must act to obtain relief. Relief under
the Act is afforded solely by court proceedings. The ex-soldier will
obviously require legal representation in obtaining such relief.
A serious problem is presented as to just how the ex-soldier can be
assured of obtaining legal advice and representation. In many, if not
most of the controversies, the soldier will not be in a position to pay
a reasonable attorney fee. Yet it would not seem proper that lawyers
be asked or even expected to continue rendering such service after the
war, entirely without compensation. The matter appears to be one
worthy of immediate consideration and action on the part of the or-
ganized bar, possibly in collaboration with federal and state authorities.
The economic readjustment of the soldier and his continuance as
part of the free-enterprise-life of the nation, may depend materially
upon the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act, and upon whether that
Act is given its real intended effect after the war. It is not only the
duty, but the privilege of the lawyer to take a leading role in accom-
plishing this purpose. Such service will advance lawyers in the regard
of their community; and an enlightened public will realize the true
meaning of law in a democracy.
108 See War Department Communications 5/24/41, 6/18/41 annexed to Report
of A.B.A. Committee on National Defense 9/29/41; also A.B.A. War Bulletin
July' 1942.
109 Sec. 105.
110 Cf. two years in Alberta and Saskatchawan, unlimited in Great Britain and
Manitoba. also discussion: 36 Ill. Law Rev. of Northwestern Univ. 333-336.
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